Warfare

Warfare helped shape the medieval Bulgarian states, whose territories shifted across the Danube region and the Balkans. Their military arrangements changed considerably between the First Bulgarian Empire, conventionally dated from 681 to 1018, and the Second Bulgarian Empire, restored in 1185 and lost during the Ottoman conquests of the late fourteenth century. Byzantine rule separated the two empires from 1018 to 1185. Across these periods, rulers drew on different mixes of mounted troops, infantry, local forces and foreign allies, adapting their methods to both the terrain and their political circumstances.

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Recruitment and command changed over time

Early descriptions present the Bulgar cavalry as the core of the army and describe adult Bulgar men as liable for military service. A ruler’s permanent force included a selected guard, while a campaign army could be assembled through clans. The newly formed state also relied on infantry composed largely of Slavs. This was not one unchanging arrangement: the forces available depended on the ruler’s authority, the demands of a campaign and the regions under Bulgarian control.

The ruler commanded the army with senior aristocratic officers. Campaign inscriptions name the kavkhan and ichirgu-boila in positions of field command, including responsibility for army wings. Their military prominence was connected with their wider standing at court and in provincial government.

In the Second Empire, military titles and offices reflected the long period of Byzantine rule. When the emperor was absent, a velik voivoda, or great commander, could lead the army; voivodas commanded smaller forces. A strator was responsible for defending a region and recruiting soldiers. These roles connected military service to the defense and administration of particular territories.

Cavalry and infantry had different roles

Mounted warfare was especially important in the early empire. Heavily armed riders carried a sword or sabre, a long spear and a bow with arrows. They also used round shields, maces and lassos; accounts describe metal armour and helmets for riders and some protection for their horses. The combination of weapons let cavalry attack at a distance and then close with an opponent. Light cavalry offered mobility, while heavily armed horsemen could deliver a forceful attack when an enemy formation weakened.

Infantry provided a different kind of strength. Early descriptions associate Slavic foot soldiers with swords, spears, bows and wooden or leather shields. The balance between foot soldiers and mounted troops shifted with circumstances. After Byzantine forces took much of the northeastern First Empire in the late tenth century, the Bulgarian military elite and much of its heavy cavalry were lost. Later accounts describe a smaller cavalry force and a greater reliance on infantry, archers and ambushes during the resistance led by Samuel.

In the Second Empire, light and mobile Cuman cavalry became an important part of the army. Cumans from lands north of the Danube served in Bulgarian campaigns, and some Cuman leaders entered the Bulgarian nobility or received military and administrative offices. Their numbers varied by campaign. Kaloyan is reported to have used 14,000 Cuman riders at the Battle of Adrianople in 1205, when his forces defeated the army of the Latin Empire and captured its emperor, Baldwin I.

Terrain and tactics shaped battles

Bulgarian commanders used reserves, ambushes and feigned retreats to disrupt enemy formations. A retreat could draw pursuers away from their order, giving Bulgarian troops an opening to turn and attack. Commanders also sometimes held cavalry back until a useful moment rather than committing all their mounted force at once. These methods were not exclusive to one period, but their use depended on the troops available and the situation in the field.

The Balkan Mountains made movement difficult and gave defenders opportunities to control routes through the passes. Outposts and fortified positions could watch these approaches and report enemy movements to senior commanders. In 811, after the Byzantine emperor Nikephoros I had taken and burned Pliska, Krum’s forces trapped the retreating Byzantine army in the Varbitsa Pass. Nikephoros was killed in the fighting. The campaign shows how an invading army that had advanced deep into Bulgarian territory could be vulnerable on its return journey.

In 986, Samuel’s forces defeated a Byzantine army at the Gates of Trajan, where Emperor Basil II narrowly escaped. In the following years, Bulgarian victories often relied on ambush and careful use of the landscape. These methods helped Samuel resist for decades, but they could not prevent Basil II from mounting repeated campaigns and taking important cities. At Kleidion in 1014, the Bulgarian army suffered a major defeat. Later accounts tell of 14,000 prisoners being blinded; the precise number and the dramatic story of Samuel’s reaction are not secure enough to treat as certain.

Adrianople in 1205 shows the danger of uncontrolled pursuit. Cuman riders drew Latin cavalry away from their ordered formation, allowing Kaloyan’s forces to surround and defeat them. The capture of Emperor Baldwin I made the battle a political disaster for the new Latin Empire as well as a defeat in the field.

Sieges and fortifications required heavy support

Fortified towns, castles and positions in mountain passes served both as obstacles to invaders and as bases for defense. Early Bulgarian forces initially had limited siege equipment, but accounts say that Krum’s reign saw the adoption of larger siege operations, with expertise obtained from people familiar with Byzantine siege warfare. By 814, Bulgarian forces were reportedly equipped with battering rams, catapults, siege towers and other machines. One account describes a large siege train transported on thousands of carts by oxen. The reported scale illustrates the logistical demands of moving heavy equipment as well as a field army.

Maintaining cavalry also required close attention to horses. Early descriptions stress that officers checked equipment and horse care before battle, and report severe penalties for neglect. The army’s dependence on mounted troops made the condition of horses a military concern, not merely a matter of personal care.

A battering ram repeatedly struck a gate or wall with a heavy beam. A catapult threw projectiles over or against defences, while a tower could lift attackers towards the wall’s height. Building, moving and protecting these devices required carpenters, draft animals and labour. An army outside a fortress also needed food and water while the attack continued.

Allies could strengthen an army, but alliances shifted

Bulgarian rulers used diplomacy as part of warfare. In the ninth and tenth centuries, Avar soldiers served the Bulgarian crown after the Avar Khaganate was conquered. The Pechenegs, a steppe people, were also used as allies or military partners. During the conflict with the Rus’ ruler Sviatoslav in the late tenth century, Bulgarian diplomacy sought Pecheneg help against him; Byzantine rulers, meanwhile, had encouraged Sviatoslav’s attack on Bulgaria. Such episodes show that neighboring powers could be partners in one conflict and opponents in another.

Relations with Byzantium also alternated between war and negotiated peace. After fighting in the early ninth century, Khan Omurtag concluded a 30-year peace treaty with the Byzantines in 815. Under Simeon I, warfare resumed on a larger scale. His long campaigns expanded Bulgarian power, but a report that about 20,000 people sought refuge in Byzantium during his reign suggests that repeated war also placed a burden on civilians. His successor Peter I renewed the peace.

Cuman support helped the Second Empire meet both Byzantine and Latin forces. Kaloyan had offered an alliance to the leaders of the Fourth Crusade, but the offer was rejected. His forces later fought the Latin Empire, including at Adrianople in 1205. Under Ivan Asen II, Bulgarian forces defeated the Despotate of Epirus at Klokotnitsa in 1230. The army’s successes relied on capable leadership and partnerships, but those relationships were political choices, not permanent military alignments.

Political division weakened later resistance

After Ivan Asen II’s death in 1241, the Second Empire faced external invasions, internal conflict and growing division among its nobles. In 1277, Ivailo, a rebel who rose from outside the ruling elite, defeated forces sent against him, including Byzantine armies. His eventual loss of support among the nobility shows how battlefield ability could not by itself resolve struggles over political authority.

In the fourteenth century, Bulgarian rulers continued to recruit outside troops, including Mongol and Alan horsemen, Western knights and forces from neighboring territories. Ivan Alexander even hired Ottoman bands in the 1350s, as Byzantine rulers also employed Ottoman soldiers. These arrangements could add strength to a campaign, but mercenaries and allies might serve different interests. During a Byzantine civil conflict in 1352, Ottoman troops defeated Serbian and possibly Bulgarian forces near Demotika, then plundered Bulgarian territory.

Ottoman forces expanded into Thrace during the mid-fourteenth century, taking major towns and defeating smaller Bulgarian forces. Long-standing mistrust between Bulgaria and Byzantium obstructed efforts to form a common front. As central authority weakened, local fortresses faced attack without reliable coordination across the country. The Ottomans captured Tarnovo in 1393 and the major Bulgarian centre of Vidin, in 1396. Resistance continued in some areas into 1422, but the loss of central leadership and major strongholds marked the end of the Second Bulgarian Empire.