Warfare

From about the seventeenth to the early twelfth century BCE, the Hittite kingdom and empire fought to control central Anatolia and, at its height, territories in northern Syria. Its warfare depended on more than the king’s army: royal forces operated alongside troops and resources drawn from subordinate kingdoms. Infantry formed the bulk of armies, while chariots provided an important mobile force. Campaigns also required trained horses, reliable supply, and the cooperation of regional rulers. The evidence is especially detailed for the clash at Kadesh around 1274 BCE, but its best-known accounts were commissioned by the Egyptian king Ramesses II and present the battle from his side.

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A royal army built from several sources

The Hittite king was the kingdom’s supreme military commander, but he relied on officials, royal relatives, and subordinate rulers to organize forces across a large territory. Vassal kingdoms, whose rulers remained in power under Hittite authority, could be required by treaty to provide military service and financial support. The troops assembled for a campaign therefore varied according to its purpose and the states that could be called upon.

This system made it possible to draw on forces from distant regions, but it also made the king’s ability to coordinate allies essential. At Kadesh, Muwatalli II brought together forces from Hatti and a wide group of allied or subordinate territories. Egyptian accounts list many of these peoples, though their figures for the size of the army cannot be treated as exact. The lists nevertheless convey the breadth of the coalition. Local rulers and Hittite authorities in Syria, including the dynasties based at Aleppo and Carchemish, served as important links between the royal court and the region’s armies.

Within a campaign force, infantry made up most of the troops. Soldiers fought with spears, bows, swords and shields. Bronze remained an important material for weapons at Kadesh. Chariots provided the army’s main mobile striking force, with trained teams carrying fighters to the point of attack.

Chariots, crews, and trained horses

Chariots required considerable preparation. A team needed suitable horses, a functioning vehicle, trained drivers and fighters, and people able to maintain and supply the animals. In Egyptian depictions of the Hittite force at Kadesh, a chariot carries three men: a driver, a combatant, and a third crew member who helped protect them. Such images provide useful evidence, although they were made for an Egyptian audience and are not a neutral inventory of every Hittite unit.

Hittite chariotry drew on expertise from the wider region. A training text associated with Kikkuli, a horse trainer from Mitanni, survives in Late Bronze Age Hittite copies. It describes conditioning chariot horses through a prolonged sequence of exercise, feeding and recovery. Walking and faster work alternated with rest, grooming and washing; grain and hay sustained the animals through the programme.

The regimen made horse care a continuing military task. Grooms and trainers had to manage exertion, feed and recovery before a team could serve on campaign. Moving an army also meant finding fodder and water at each stage of the march.

Command and coordination on campaign

The king’s presence could place the ruler at the center of military command, while high-ranking officials and members of the royal family helped lead forces. In the Syrian territories, regional rulers and Hittite authorities could contribute troops and local knowledge. This arrangement linked central authority with local command, but it also meant that an army assembled from several kingdoms needed orders and timing to hold together in the field.

Kadesh illustrates the problems of coordination. In the Egyptian account, the Hittite chariots struck an Egyptian division while it was moving toward the main camp, then attacked the camp itself. A common reconstruction holds that the Egyptians regrouped and counterattacked as more of their forces arrived. The Egyptian texts credit Ramesses with a leading role, but they also describe the arrival of other troops. One contingent, called the Ne’arin in Egyptian accounts, helped turn the fighting; its precise identity and origin remain uncertain.

Ramesses commemorated the battle in reliefs and texts known as the Poem and the Bulletin. They make the king the centre of the action and give his courage a prominent place. The surviving narrative therefore tells us how the Egyptian court presented the encounter as well as describing its operations.

Supplying armies over long distances

Campaigns required food and water for people, fodder for horses, and the means to keep vehicles and equipment in working order. A Hittite letter from a commander serving in Amurru describes the strain of remaining in the field: after months of watching routes and approaches, the writer reports broken chariots, dead horses, and absent soldiers, and asks his superior what should happen next. The letter’s date is debated, but it gives a concrete account of how prolonged service could wear down a force before a decisive battle took place.

Military obligations placed costs on subordinate states as well as the Hittite court. Treaties could require them to contribute troops and financial support, while campaigns could remove workers from agriculture and other production. Captives taken in war also became a source of labor, including for food production. The army’s ability to fight therefore rested on the same populations and resources needed to sustain the kingdom beyond the campaign season.

Attacking cities and fighting at Kadesh

A literary account of the siege of Urshu, usually associated with Hattusili I’s Syrian campaigns, describes a king frustrated by a slow attack. He orders a battering ram and the construction of an earth ramp. A ram used the repeated impact of a heavy beam to damage a gate or wall, while a ramp raised the attackers’ approach towards the fortifications. Capturing a city demanded timber, earthmoving and protected access as well as fighting men.

At Kadesh, the battlefield attack failed to deliver control of the fortified city. Ramesses did not capture it, and the Hittites retained their position in the disputed northern Syrian region. The distinction mattered: a ruler could celebrate the courage of his troops while still failing to obtain the territory for which the campaign had been fought.

Further campaigning followed Kadesh. Hattusili III and Ramesses II eventually concluded peace in Ramesses’s twenty-first regnal year, around 1259–1258 BCE. The agreement recognised a relationship between powers whose armies had been unable to settle their rivalry by a single campaign.

For the wider setting, see Hittite historical context.