Ayyubid Armies, Citadels and Frontier Diplomacy

From the abolition of the Fatimid caliphate in Egypt in 1171 to the loss of Ayyubid power in Syria in 1260, the dynasty relied on armies and fortified centres to defend a realm that was often politically divided. Saladin established Ayyubid rule in Egypt and extended it into Syria; after his death, members of the ruling family governed separate principalities, sometimes cooperating and sometimes competing. Military power therefore depended not only on the sultan’s own forces but also on troops maintained by princes and local rulers. Citadels served as defensive strongholds and seats of authority, while diplomacy with neighbouring powers, including the Crusader states, could be as important as fighting.

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A military system built around rulers and their households

Ayyubid forces drew on military arrangements inherited from earlier rulers, especially the Zengids, and adapted them to a dynasty whose territories were governed by members of one family. Saladin’s army included Kurdish and Turkic troops, Arab tribal contingents and some former Fatimid forces. The mix varied across time and place. Major cities and principalities maintained contingents according to their resources, which the sultan could call upon when required; princes and military commanders also kept forces of their own.

One important component was the mamluk, a soldier of slave origin acquired by a ruler or commander for military service. Ayyubid sultans and princes maintained household contingents identified with their patrons, including forces associated with Shirkuh, Saladin and al-Adil. These troops existed alongside free-born soldiers, particularly in the cavalry. The resulting army was not a single force recruited and administered in the same way throughout the realm. Its strength depended on the ruler’s ability to assemble his own retainers and secure cooperation from other Ayyubid princes and regional emirs.

Payment and revenue obligations linked military service to the resources of the state. Soldiers could receive a monthly salary called a jāmakiyya. Commanders might also receive an iqtaʿ, an assignment of revenues rather than private ownership of the land itself. In return, the holder was expected to provide a specified number of trained and equipped cavalrymen when summoned. The arrangement helped rulers support mounted forces without maintaining every soldier directly from the central treasury, but it also made military strength dependent on the willingness and capacity of revenue-holders to meet their obligations.

Cavalry, command and mobilization

Cavalry was central to Ayyubid campaigns. Kurdish and Turkic soldiers served alongside Arab and Turcoman contingents, while princes and commanders maintained their own followings. Mobilisation brought these forces together for a particular operation. A ruler therefore needed to secure cooperation as well as issue orders: a prince’s resources and rival commitments could determine how many troops reached the campaign.

The sultan could lead an expedition or entrust it to a commander. Regional princes and emirs brought their own contingents, giving military command a political dimension. Coordinating arrival, supply and movements among such forces was essential. Disputes among their patrons could break a coalition apart or prevent a campaign from continuing.

Horses were not simply battlefield equipment: their care and training were part of the institutions that supported mounted service. In Cairo, al-Kamil established a horse market and a large open training ground used for horsemanship and military exercises as well as parades. Revenue assignments that required holders to provide trained cavalry connected this kind of preparation to the wider system of military service. The example also shows how military activity occupied space in a major city, beyond the walls of its fortress.

Citadels as defences and seats of authority

A citadel combined military defence with the practical business of ruling. It could house a garrison and stores, provide a protected residence for a ruler, and serve as a fortified centre within a city. Ayyubid rulers used existing strongholds and built or altered others, but their designs responded to local settings rather than following a single plan. Damascus had an urban citadel on level ground within its defences; Cairo’s citadel stood on the Muqattam Hills overlooking the city.

Saladin began building Cairo’s citadel in 1176, in part to protect the capital against a possible Crusader attack and to give his regime a secure centre. Construction used limestone from the nearby hills, and the chief eunuch and confidant Baha al-Din Qaraqush oversaw the work. Christian prisoners of war were among the labourers used in the project. Saladin also planned a wall enclosing Cairo and nearby Fustat, with the citadel as a central defensive point, although the wall was not completed as originally envisaged. Later Ayyubid rulers continued work at the fortress, and al-Kamil developed it with residences and administrative buildings. Its role as a royal residence and government centre changed over time; it was not the permanent residence of every Ayyubid ruler.

Water supply was another part of Cairo’s defensive infrastructure. Saladin ordered the excavation of an 85-metre-deep well, known as Joseph’s Well. Its upper section had a spiral stairway, which could be covered to make a ramp for oxen. Ox-powered wheels raised water from the lower shaft and then lifted it further. The well offered a source within the fortress, while later work on aqueducts brought additional water from the Nile. These systems show how a citadel’s usefulness depended not only on walls and soldiers but also on engineering that could sustain its inhabitants.

In Damascus, Saladin occupied the citadel in 1174. Al-Adil rebuilt its fortifications in the early thirteenth century, surrounding older walls with larger masonry and projecting towers. The new works strengthened a stronghold on level ground, where attackers could approach without first climbing a hill. Towers provided positions from which defenders could strike along the adjoining walls and approaches.

The northern entrance was especially well defended: a drawbridge, three towers and an indirect passage obstructed a direct assault. The eastern entrance faced the city and carried more elaborate ornament. Galleries connected parts of the fortification, and excavations have identified a medieval weapons smithy in its southwest quarter. The fortress combined protected access, circulation and practical military work.

Supplying armies and sustaining campaigns

Military plans were constrained by the resources an army could carry or obtain on the move. A campaign required horses and equipped soldiers, but also food, stores and access to water. The demands could limit how long forces remained in the field. During Saladin’s operations near Belvoir in 1182, his army withdrew after supplies ran low and it could no longer sustain its position. The episode illustrates why a force’s size or battlefield success alone did not determine whether it could continue a campaign.

Fortifications could help protect resources and provide secure bases, but they were not independent of their surroundings. Cairo’s well and aqueduct system addressed water needs within the citadel. Damascus’s position and waterworks connected the fortress to the city’s wider supply. Elsewhere, rulers sought to protect routes used by merchants and pilgrims. These routes mattered both for movement and for the revenues and political relationships associated with travel and trade.

Military operations also reached the coast and sea routes. Ayyubid forces in Yemen defended shores and shipping. In the Red Sea, al-Adil organised the response to Crusader raiders who threatened commercial and pilgrimage traffic. Naval action complemented the defence of ports and land routes, extending the problem of supply and security beyond inland citadels.

Diplomacy on divided frontiers

Ayyubid rulers faced Crusader states in the Levant, but relations were not defined by continuous warfare. Truces could secure a frontier, protect movement or allow a ruler to concentrate on a rival. Saladin and the Kingdom of Jerusalem concluded truces before fighting resumed. After the Third Crusade, the agreement with Richard I recognized Crusader control of part of the coast, while Christians could travel as unarmed pilgrims to Jerusalem. Negotiation was one means of managing military pressure, not a substitute for maintaining the ability to fight.

The same flexibility appeared in dealings with Muslim neighbours. Saladin’s agreement with the Zengid ruler of Mosul in 1186 left the Zengids in control of the city, while requiring them to provide military support when requested and making territorial concessions to the Ayyubids. The arrangement illustrates how a settlement could secure practical military cooperation without transferring every contested city to direct Ayyubid rule. Al-Adil also responded to a Georgian challenge to Ayyubid power around Khilat by gathering troops from several Syrian principalities. The conflict ended in a long truce in 1210, rather than an open-ended campaign.

Al-Kamil’s negotiations with Frederick II began while he faced his brother al-Mu’azzam of Damascus. Al-Mu’azzam died in 1227; by the treaty of 1229, the Damascus ruler was his son al-Nasir Dawud. The settlement gave Frederick control of Jerusalem for a limited period while retaining Muslim control of its Islamic holy places. Al-Nasir Dawud opposed it, showing how negotiations with an external ruler could deepen a family dispute.

The Fifth Crusade captured Damietta in 1219 but lost its position in the Nile Delta in 1221. River routes, flood conditions and access to provisions constrained the invading army. Ayyubid resistance combined troop concentration with pressure on its movement and supply. Control of Egypt’s waterways could therefore decide whether an army could advance, remain in place or withdraw.

Changes after the mid-thirteenth century

The military households that supported the sultanate eventually helped replace it. Mamluk commanders killed Turanshah in 1250 and established a new regime in Egypt. Ten years later, Mongol conquest and Mamluk expansion ended the major Syrian Ayyubid principalities. Smaller branches survived under new overlords, but the earlier balance between family princes, household troops and a senior sultan had broken down.

For the wider setting, see The Ayyubids: History, Government and Society in Egypt and Syria.